Introduction
When I first read this book, in around 2016, I had primarily been concerned with Bill Browder’s chronicling of the fate of his lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, the young attorney who was unlawfully arrested, kept in prison, tortured and in the end murdered by the Russian regime under Putin. Now, with the evolution of the tragic attacks by Russia on its neighbor, Ukraine, I decided to pick up the book again to better understand the Russian system, with several actors seemingly quite similar to Putin. Sergei Magnitsky’s fate remains a tragedy of course, but my main reasons for reviewing this book are not to attempt to shed more light on the Russian regime, Mr. Putin himself and the apparent psyche of the Russian elite.
A key point needs to be raised at this stage. There seems to be rampant organized crime in Russia, augmenting what might be assessed as “Putin’s actions”. Thus, it is probably a combination of Putin and organized crime which is at play. This is perhaps particularly well-articulated by the late Senator John McCain, who, after reading Mr. Browder’s book stated “[this book is] for anyone interested in understanding the culture of corruption and impurity of Putin’s Russia today”.
Let me first start with the author, Bill Browder. Browder lived in Russia for more than two decades and was the founder and CEO of Hermitage Capital Management, the largest foreign investor in Russia until 2005. Before founding Hermitage, he worked for BCG and Salomon Brothers. He has a BA from University of Chicago and holds a Stanford MBA.
Hermitage Capital’s saga is impressive. In 1997, the fund was ranked the best performing fund in the world, up 235% for the year and 718% from inception. Assets under management had grown from USD 25M to more than 1 billion USD. The fund was run by a wunderkind of modern-day finance. It then had several years with severe losses and was 90% down in 1998. However, by the end of 2003, the fund had gone up more than 1200% from the bottom of the market. All the losses had been recovered.
Bill Browder was, however, declared a persona non grata by Russia on November 13th, 2005, and was deported from Russia. Thereafter, his so-far highly successful investment company went into a tailspin. While he attempted to identify countries with significantly undervalued stocks elsewhere, his Hermitage Global Fund did not really take off. Mr. Browder himself gradually became what we might label as a human rights activist, i.e., quite a contrast to his earlier profile as a successful investment banker. The book is thus “a sizzling account of Browder’s rise, fall and metamorphosis from investment banker to renowned human activist” (The Economist).
This book is written well before the tragic war between Russia and its neighbor, Ukraine. It deals with Mr. Browder’s “agenda”, as a successful business executive in Moscow and later as a proponent of various human rights measures in Russia, above all the passing in the US of the so-called Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability act on December 14th, 2012. A similar law later was also passed by the EU parliament on April 2nd, 2014. The gist of these legislations was to deny some 20 named Russian individuals deemed to have been directly involved with the jailing and murdering of Sergei Magnitsky.
But, as already stated, this reviewer has now primarily been preoccupied with legal and human rights conditions in Russia, as Mr. Browder saw them during his successful stint as a business executive in Russia. My sense is that these traits might be as articulate today as they were two decades ago. The advent of the Ukrainian conflict seems to confirm Mr. Browder’s observations and experiences. However, before detailing there, let us first clarify the meaning of Red Notice, which is also the name of this book.
Red Notice, and Mr. Browder’s career
According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Red Notice is “a communication issued by Interpol requesting the arrest of wanted persons, with a view to extradition. An Interpol Red Notice is the closest instrument to an international arrest warrant in use today”. Let us briefly rassess what happened to Mr. Browder after December 2015, before articulating what he sees as prototypical sides of Putin’s Russia. Before going further though, let us briefly inspect what happened to Mr. Browder after 1995 as he became an activist. Mr. Browder's activities over the last few years have been largely focused on human activism. As noted, he has spent considerable efforts on clearing the name of Sergei Magnitsky. Also, he seems to be "attacked" by various Russian initiatives, typically relatively ill-conceived and propaganda-fuelled, but nevertheless calling for responses. While Mr. Browder is free to move around in North America and Western Europe, he has of course not visited Russia since 1995.
Rather than reviewing the various chapters of Mr. Browder’s book, let me now highlight what seems to be some twelve fundamental sides to how Putin’s Russia functions, all taken from the book:
To save face
Russians always look for ways to save face. Putin never backs down from a fight. He does not want to show any weakness, ever. Still, he is known for keeping options open as long as possible. When Putin gets humiliated, he retaliates by lashing out against the person who humiliates him. Being publicly humiliated is the worst. So, it is counter-attack, counter-attack, counter-attack, rather than accepting facts and defeat. An example might be Putin's reaction to Mr. Browder: “we never mention enemies by name. I am instructing my law enforcement agencies to open up as many criminal cases against him as possible”. Mr. Putin is never inclined to retreat. As Mr. Browder says (CNN 17/3/2022) "he does not have a reverse gear, only forward ones". In those cases where Putin is forced to retreat, it is typically only temporarily so, in order for him to gain time to regroup and get renewed strength so that he can attack again.
Lack of predictability of Russian Actions
As Sir Winston Churchill said as early as 1939, they are “a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”. This black hole still seems to be the dominating reality.
Cover-ups
Denial seems to be the norm. Russian state-sponsored lying seems to be standard. Known for fabricating evidence, to make actions more powerful, according to their own logic, fabricated evidence is often modified along the way. There are often glaring inconsistencies and lies.
Protests
Putin seems to ignore protests, cultivating an aura of invincibility. Those who might protest, or even emigrate, are labelled as “scum”.
Russian “stories” – empty talk
The Russians are skilled in talking without saying anything. Some say that Russian stories never have happy endings.
Humiliation
Putin seems to humiliate people to put them in their place. He appears happy only when an opponent has failed and is miserable.
Putin himself
He has perhaps become more and more brazen over the years, judging him in 2002 compared to today.
End point?
Is there an end point? Perhaps not, since organized crime is part of it all and is likely to continue even after Putin's departure.
Russia’s system of justice
It is often brutal, often even barbaric. Rather than being based on more or less objective criteria, it is subject to interpretation by the ruling elite: 2 + 2 = 5; White is black; Up is down; etc. There are negotiations in which neither law nor logic play a role.
Putin’s judgement of contemplated actions
Russians may be nasty, but they are only human, just like everybody else. They will make mistakes. One key mistake might be failure in judging consequences of actions, such as now, for example, how the West came together even more as a consequence of the Russian attack on Ukraine, and equally so, misjudging domestic opposition to the war.
Domestic misinformation campaign
Russia’s reaction to US’s enactment of the so-called Sergei Magnitsky act is a case in point. Russian children were no longer allowed to be adopted by US foster parents. Russians at large generally have soft hearts when it comes to children, and there were considerable, unexpected domestic reactions.
Sanctions
Do they work? Might the cost of sanctions be so high that Putin might ultimately back down? There were sanctions imposed on Russia in the 1970s and Russian restrictions when it comes to allowing Jews to emigrate. Ultimately Russia relented, 1.5 million Jews were allowed to emigrate, and the sanctions were lifted.
Conclusions
I recommend Mr. Browder's book for everyone who might want to gain more insight into what seems to be the key determinants for Russia’s behavior in the war with Ukraine. While it is true that Putin's view when it comes to Russia - its geography and role - seems to be that the ancient harmony enjoyed during Imperial and Soviet periods should be reestablished, the issue of how the Russian regime seems to operate to make this happen is perhaps more complex and harder to understand. This book sheds important light on this. The book is as important today as it was when it was first published in 2015. I recommend this to all of you.
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